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The set of maximin actions in general decision problems is characterized.
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Choosing between alternatives according to the maximin criterion essentially
involves associating with each alternative the worst possible consequence and
then choosing the alternative(s) for which this worst-case scenario oers the
best possible result. Dierent ways of modeling these actions, consequences
(or states), and preferences/utilities over them yield an abundance of applica-
tions of this decision principle and its sibling, minimax behavior, in the social
sciences:
 Game theory: The minimax theorem of von Neumann (cf. von Neumann,
1928) is one of the cornerstones of game theory. It establishes maximin
behavior as an equilibrating device that assigns to every mixed extension
of a nite two person zero-sum (or purely antagonistic) game a well-dened
value.
 Experimental economics: Sarin and Vahid (1999, 2001) show that max-
imin behavior is the outcome of a natural and simple dynamic process of
strategy adjustment and provides a good prediction of human behavior in
several experimental settings.
 Statistical decision theory: Next to the Bayesian paradigm, the max-
imin approach is standard in statistical decision theory (cf. Blackwell and
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2Girshick, 1954; Ferguson, 1967).
 Social choice and welfare: Rawlsian welfare aims for the maximiza-
tion of the utility of the least \happy" member of a society; see Moulin
(1988) for a textbook treatment.
 Operations research: Problems like the optimal location of warehouses
often involve the minimization of suitable distance functions. Among these
distance functions, the Chebychev/supremum norm is a common one, trans-
forming the problem in one of the minimax type (cf. Love et al., 1988).
 Constrained optimization: The Lagrangean dual of a constrained min-
imization problem is of the maximin type (cf. Bazaraa et al., 1993, Ch.
6).
Given the ubiquity of the maximin principle, it is hardly surprising that also
its foundations have been the subject of study. These studies tend to focus
on one of two aspects: (a) characterizing the order induced by the maximin
criterion, like in the classical study Milnor (1954) and in Barber a and Jackson
(1988), or (b) characterizing the solution that assigns to each decision problem
its set of maximin actions, like in Maskin (1979). 1
Both Milnor (1954) and Maskin (1979) deal with decision problems in which
the set of actions and the set of states are nite; moreover, both authors remark
that their results can be extended to an innite setting. Indeed, Milnor's results
1 The paper by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) is a hybrid between the two dierent
approaches: it shows that a set of solutions has certain properties if and only if
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of minimal and maximal payos associated with each action.
3can be extended in a more or less direct way. This, however, is not the case for
Maskin's characterizations. In this paper, we clarify the problems underlying
an extension of Maskin's results. See, in particular, Remarks 4 and 5.
Moreover, in this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the solu-
tion that assigns to each decision problem, with arbitrary sets of actions and
states, its (possibly empty) set of maximin actions. An explicit comparison
between the properties used in our characterization and those used by Milnor
and Maskin is provided in Remark 7.
This general setting is required in a number of the applications mentioned
above, where the sets of actions or states may be innite. Think, for instance,
of estimating an unknown probability in the area of statistical decision theory.
The main challenge posed by such a general setting | apart from the possible
emptiness of the set of maximin actions | is that (all) maximin actions can
be strictly dominated. See Example 2. Consequently, the classical domination
axioms upon which many characterizations rely no longer hold: they exclude
dominated actions from the solution of the problem. We introduce a new
axiom, Inclusion of Weak Dominators, that changes the negative focus of the
classical axioms (excluding `bad' actions) to a positive one (including `good'
ones): it requires that any action weakly dominating a selected action should
also be selected.
That maximin actions may be strictly dominated should not be seen as some-
thing negative. It simply stresses the fundamental dierence in choice theory
between rational choice on the one hand and our setting of cautious choice on
the other. Rational choice involves searching for a best action, cautious choice
involves trying to avoid disastrous outcomes, and even if one action strictly
4dominates another, their worst-case scenarios may well be the same. This is
elaborated upon in Remarks 4 and 7.
In the next section, we formally dene the class of decision problems, list the
properties used in our characterization, state the characterization theorem
and make some comments on the relationship between our results and others
already existing in the literature. The proof of our characterization is contained
in section 3.
2 A characterization of the set of maximin actions
A decision problem is a tuple (A;
;u), where A is a nonempty set of actions,

 is a nonempty set of states, and u : A
 ! R is a bounded function which
represents the decision-maker's payo/utility function. The set of all decision
problems is denoted by D.
A solution on D is a correspondence ' that assigns to every (A;
;u) 2 D a
set '(A;
;u)  A of actions. Our aim is to characterize the solution M that
assigns to every decision problem (A;
















Let us make a few remarks on our domain D of decision problems.
Remark 1 Since only the order of the payos matters, order-preserving trans-
formations do not aect the solution and the assumption that our payos are
bounded entails no loss of generality. 2
2 Simply apply an order-preserving transformation making the decision-maker's
5The next two examples illustrate the diculties one faces when passing from
nite decision problems to general decision problems. Recall that an action
a 2 A in a decision problem D = (A;
;u) 2 D is strictly dominated if there
is an action a0 2 A with u(a0;!) > u(a;!) for all ! 2 
.
Example 2 Consider a decision problem (A;
;u) with A = 
 = Z and
u(a;!) = arctan(a !) for all (a;!) 2 ZZ. Then inf!2Z u(a;!) =  =2 for
all a 2 Z. Hence, every a 2 Z is a maximin action, but also strictly dominated,
for instance by a+1. Moreover, if one were to restrict the action space to only
two elements, say  A = f1;2g, then M(  A;
;u) =  A, and the maximin action
1 is strictly dominated.
Example 3 Consider a decision problem (A;
;u) with A = N, 
 is any
nonempty set, and u(a;!) = a=(a+1) for all (a;!) 2 A
. Then inf!2
 u(a;!) =
a=(a + 1), a function which does not achieve a maximum: M(A;
;u) = ;.
In our general setting, some properties of simpler, nite problems no longer
hold: (all) maximin actions can be strictly dominated (Example 2) and the set
of maximin actions may be empty (Example 3). The following table displays
the diculties one may nd in innite cases.



























Remark 4 Regarding Example 2, a referee observed that \...the maximin
choice rule is not so appealing in this context...In particular, it violates the
basic requirement that a strictly dominated action should not be chosen." It is a
requirement in the standard `rational' (payo maximizing) approach to choice
theory, but denitely not in behavioral models like the satiscing approach of
Simon (1956), nor in our setting of cautious choice, where the idea is to avoid
`disastrous' outcomes, rather than achieving a best one. It will be obvious from
Example 2 that in an innite setting the property (5) of strong domination
that Maskin (1979) uses in the characterization of the maximin solution is
not applicable.
Remark 5 In the choice of our domain D, our aim was to be as nonrestric-
tive as possible: the sets of actions A and states 
 are only required to be
nonempty to avoid trivialities. The sets may be nite, innite, and in the lat-
ter case countably or uncountably innite. The payo function u is assumed
to be bounded, which by Remark 1 entails no loss of generality. We believe
that this generality is more natural than explicitly restricting oneself to a do-
main where the set of maximin actions is nonempty: it leaves no ghosts in
7the closet. Consequently, a characterization of the set of maximin actions in
an innite setting calls for some additional properties related to the possible
non-existence. This is another reason why the results of Maskin (1979) do not
extend to the innite setting: he explicitly assumes that solutions assign to
each problem a nonempty set of actions.
We introduce some properties for a solution ' on D. They are relatively stan-
dard and adapted from properties in Milnor (1954), Barber a and Jackson
(1988), and Maskin (1979). An explicit discussion of the relations and dif-
ferences is provided in Remark 7 after all properties have been introduced.
Anonymity requires that the solution does not depend on the way actions and
states are labeled.
Anonymity (ANO). Let (A;
;u);(A0;
0;u0) 2 D. If there are bijections
f : A ! A0 and g : 
 ! 
0 such that u(a;!) = u0(f(a);g(!)) for all




Independence of irrelevant actions states that if the action set of a decision
problem is reduced, but some elements in the solution set of the large problem
remain feasible, then the solution set of the small problem consists of the
feasible elements in the solution set of the original problem.
Independence of irrelevant actions (IIA). Let (A;
;u);(A0;
;u0) 2
D be such that A ( A0 and u0
jA
 = u. If '(A0;
;u0) \ A 6= ;, then
'(A0;
;u0) \ A = '(A;
;u).
Inheritance of nonemptiness states that adding nitely many actions to a
decision problem with a nonempty solution set yields a new decision problem
whose solution set is also nonempty.
8Inheritance of nonemptiness (INH-NEM). Let (A;
;u);(A0;
;u0) 2
D be such that A ( A0 and u0
jA
 = u. If '(A;
;u) 6= ; and A0 n A is a
nite set, then '(A0;
;u0) 6= ;.
In a decision problem (A;
;u) 2 D, action a0 2 A weakly dominates action
a 2 A if u(a0;!)  u(a;!) for all ! 2 
, with a strict inequality for some
! 2 
. The inclusion of weak dominators property states that if an action
weakly dominates an action in the solution set of the problem, then also the
weakly dominating action belongs to the solution set.
Inclusion of weak dominators (IWD). Let (A;
;u) 2 D and a;a0 2 A.
If a 2 '(A;
;u) and a0 weakly dominates a, then a0 2 '(A;
;u).
The next property requires that duplicating states does not aect the solution
set.
Duplication of states (DOS). Let (A;
;u);(A;
0;u0) 2 D with 
 ( 
0.
If there is a surjection g : 
0 ! 
 such that u0(a;!0) = u(a;g(!0)) for all




Continuity states that if an action is always contained in the solution set of
a sequence of decision problems in D with xed action and state spaces and
pointwise convergent utility functions, then this action is also contained in the
solution set of the limiting problem.
Continuity (CONT). Let (A;
;u) 2 D and let f(A;
;uk)gk2N be a se-
quence in D such that limk!1 uk(a;!) = u(a;!) for all (a;!) 2 A  
. If
there is an a 2 A with a 2 '(A;
;uk) for all k 2 N, then a 2 '(A;
;u):
Restricted nonemptiness states that, for a given decision problem, if there
9exists some maximin action, then there also exists some element of the solution
set. In the literature, this type of property is used in both cooperative games
(cf. Voorneveld and van den Nouweland, 1998) and noncooperative games (cf.
Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Norde et al., 1996; Voorneveld et al., 1999). In our
context, it is related with the possible emptiness of the set of maximin actions.
Restricted Nonemptiness (r-NEM). Let (A;
;u) 2 D. If M(A;
;u)
is nonempty, then '(A;
;u) is also nonempty.
Convexity states that if two actions belong to the solution set of a decision
problem and an action is added whose payo is the (1
2; 1
2)-convex combination
of the above actions' payos, then the new action belongs to the solution
set of the new problem. This is a standard risk neutrality property already
present in Milnor (1954): if two actions belong to the problem's solution set,
the decision-maker does not mind tossing a coin to decide between them.
Convexity (CONV). Let (A;
;u);(A0;
;u0) 2 D be such that A0 =
A[fa0g for some a0 = 2 A and u0
jA













for all ! 2 
, then a0 2 '(A0;
;u0):
Finally, if there is only one state, then the solution chooses the actions that
maximize the payo.
One state rationality (OSR). Take (A;
;u) 2 D with j
j = 1. Writing

 = f!g, '(A;
;u) = argmaxa2A u(a;!).
The former properties characterize the solution M on D which assigns to each
decision problem its set of maximin actions:
10Theorem 6 The maximin solution M is the unique solution on D satisfying
ANO, IIA, INH-NEM, IWD, DOS, CONT, r-NEM, CONV, and OSR.
The proof is given in the next section. First, in Remark 7, we relate the current
properties to existing properties in the literature, in particular Milnor (1954)
and Maskin (1979).
Remark 7 ANO corresponds to Milnor's Symmetry axiom and Maskin's Prop-
erty (11). IIA implies Milnor's Row Adjunction axiom and it combines Maskin's
properties (1) and (2). DOS corresponds to Milnor's Column Duplication ax-
iom and Maskin's Property (12). CONT is analogous to Milnor's Continuity
axiom and Maskin's Property (10). CONV corresponds to Milnor's Convex-
ity axiom and Maskin's Property (9). IWD is a bit stronger than Maskin's
Property (4) and it takes the role of Milnor's Strong Domination axiom and
Maskin's Property (5), although IWD is essentially dierent from these two
properties. Finally, OSR, INH-NEM and r-NEM are properties related with
the emptiness issue that arises in our general setting; they are not connected
to any of the properties in Milnor (1954) or in Maskin (1979). OSR is a
rather natural property, while INH-NEM and r-NEM are of a more technical
nature. Nevertheless, the following example shows that these properties cannot
be dispensed with in our characterization of the maximin solution.




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
M(A;
;u) if for each a 2 A, u(a;) is a constant function,
; otherwise.
One readily veries that ' satises all properties in Theorem 6, except for
INH-NEM and r-NEM.
11Remark 9 indicates which properties are violated by other well-known solu-
tions; the reader is referred to the papers cited below for their denitions.
Remark 9 The minimax solution satises all properties in Theorem 6 ex-
cept IWD and r-NEM. The maximax solution satises all except CONV and
r-NEM. The minimin solution satises all with the exception of IWD, r-NEM,
and CONV. In our general setting, technical diculties arise in dening the
leximin, protective (cf. Barber a and Jackson, 1988), and leximax solutions (cf.
Naeve, 2000), as well as the Laplacian criterion of insucient reason (cf. Mil-
nor, 1954). If one were to restrict attention to decision problems with a nite
set of states, the leximin solution does not satisfy DOS, CONT, and r-NEM,
the protective solution does not satisfy CONT and r-NEM; the leximax so-
lution does not satisfy DOS, CONT, r-NEM, and CONV, and, nally, the
Laplacian principle of insucient reason does not satisfy DOS and r-NEM.
Remark 10 Theorem 6 remains valid on other domains of decision problems,
as long as these domains are closed under certain transformations mentioned
in our characterizing properties (like the duplication of states). For instance,
Theorem 6 is still true if we deal with the subsets of D where A is nite, where

 is nite, or where both A and 
 are nite. In fact, some of the properties
(like r-NEM in case of nite action sets) may be dispensed with.
3 Proof of the characterization theorem
The purpose of this section is to prove our characterization theorem. The proof
is based on a series of lemmas.
The properties ANO and IIA of a solution guarantee that if an action has the
12same payo function as an element of the solution set of the problem | up to
relabeling of the states | then also the former action belongs to the solution
set. We only use a simple version:
Lemma 11 Let ' be a solution on D satisfying ANO and IIA, and let D =
(A;
;u) 2 D. If a 2 '(D) and a0 2 A is such that, for some !1;!2 2 
,
(i) u(a0;!1) = u(a;!2) and u(a0;!2) = u(a;!1),
(ii) u(a0;!) = u(a;!) for all ! 2 
 n f!1;!2g,
then a0 2 '(D).
PROOF. Assume that u(a;!1) 6= u(a;!2) (otherwise ANO concludes the
result). The utility functions for actions a and a0 are represented in the table















































13where the utility for a and a0 is interchanged, i.e.
v(a;!1) = v(a0;!2) := u(a;!2);
v(a;!2) = v(a0;!1) := u(a;!1);
and v(b;!) := u(b;!) for all other (b;!) 2 fa;a0g(
 n f!1;!2g). By (i) and
(ii), D2 is isomorphic to D1, either via switching the labels of a and a0 or via
switching the labels of !1 and !2.
Note that D can be obtained from D1 by adding actions and, moreover,
a 2 '(D) \ fa;a0g. Therefore, by IIA:
'(D1) = '(D) \ fa
;a
0g; (1)
so that a 2 '(D1). It is shown that also a0 2 '(D1). Consider the bijection
f : fa;a0g ! fa;a0g with f(a) = a0;f(a0) = a and let g : 
 ! 
 be the
identity function. Since u(a;!) = v(f(a);g(!)) for all (a;!) 2 fa;a0g  
,
ANO implies that '(D2) = f('(D1)), so a0 = f(a) 2 '(D2). Next, con-
sider the bijection  g : 
 ! 
 with  g(!1) = !2;  g(!2) = !1, keeping other
states unchanged, and let  f : fa;a0g ! fa;a0g be the identity function. Since
v(a;!) = u(  f(a);  g(!)) for all (a;!) 2 fa;a0g
, ANO implies that '(D1) =
 f('(D2)) = '(D2). Remember that a0 2 '(D2), so a0 2 '(D1). This shows
that fa;a0g = '(D1).
Finally, by (1), a0 2 '(D): 2
With the INH-NEM property and Lemma 11 one can establish the following
consequence. If we add an action to a decision problem with the same utility
as an action in the solution set of the original problem, except in two states
14where the utilities are interchanged, then both actions belong to the solution
set of the new problem:
Lemma 12 Let ' be a solution on D satisfying ANO, IIA, and INH-NEM,
and let D = (A;
;u) 2 D. Take D0 = (A0;
;u0) 2 D satisfying that A0 = A[
fa0g for some a0 = 2 A and u0
jA
 = u. Suppose that there exist a 2 '(A;
;u)
and !1;!2 2 
 such that
(i) u0(a0;!1) = u0(a;!2) and u0(a0;!2) = u0(a;!1),
(ii) u0(a0;!) = u0(a;!) for all ! 2 
 n f!1;!2g.
Then fa;a0g  '(D0).
PROOF. Note that D0 is well-dened. Suppose that a0 = 2 '(D0). Since '
satises INH-NEM, A0 nA = fa0g is a nite set, and '(D) 6= ;: '(D0) 6= ;: So
'(D0)\A 6= ; and IIA implies that '(D0)\A = '(D). Therefore a 2 '(D0).
By Lemma 11, also a0 2 '(D0), a contradiction. Hence, a0 2 '(D0) and using
Lemma 11 again it follows that a 2 '(D0). So fa;a0g  '(D0): 2
Consider the following modication of weak dominance. In a decision problem
(A;
;u) 2 D, action a0 2 A quasi-dominates action a 2 A if there exist
!1;!2 2 
 such that:
(i) u(a0;!)  u(a;!) for all ! 2 
 n f!1g, and
(ii) u(a0;!2)  u(a;!1) > u(a0;!1)  u(a;!2).
Intuitively, a0 quasi-dominates a if it is at least as good as a in all states except
some !1, and the loss from choosing a0 in state !1 is compensated for by a
utility gain in another state !2.
15The next Lemma shows that a solution satisfying ANO, IIA, INH-NEM, and
IWD, satises the following property: if an action quasi-dominates an action
in the solution set, then the former action also belongs to the solution set.
Lemma 13 Let ' be a solution on D satisfying ANO, IIA, INH-NEM, and
IWD, and let D = (A;
;u) 2 D. If a 2 '(D) and a0 2 A quasi-dominates
a, then a0 2 '(D).
PROOF. Let !1;!2 2 
 be as in the denition of quasi-dominance. De-
ne the decision problem D0 = (A [ fg;
;u0) 2 D with  = 2 A, u0
jA
 =
u, u0(;!) = u(a;!) for all ! 2 
 n f!1;!2g, u0(;!1) = u(a;!2), and
u0(;!2) = u(a;!1). By Lemma 12: fa;g  '(D0). Now a0 weakly domi-
nates  unless u0(a0;!) = u0(;!) for all ! 2 
 (in which case a0 2 '(D0) by
ANO). So, by IWD, a0 2 '(D0).
Hence, fa;;a0g  '(D0). Now '(D) = '(D0) \ A by IIA, so a0 2 '(D). 2
If a solution satises ANO, IIA, INH-NEM, IWD, DOS, and CONT, then
whether or not an action belongs to the solution set of a decision problem
depends exclusively on the inmum and supremum of its payos.
Lemma 14 Let ' be a solution on D satisfying ANO, IIA, INH-NEM, IWD,
DOS, and CONT, and let D = (A;



















then a0 2 '(D).
16PROOF. If m = M, then a and a0 yield the same, constant payo, regardless
of !, so ANO and a 2 '(D) imply that a0 2 '(D). So henceforth assume
that m < M. This means that 
 has at least two elements. Let !1 2 
. Dene
for each (";) 2 R2
+ the decision problem D"; = (A [ f;g;
;u";) with




> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
u(a0;!) +  if ~ a = a0;
m + " if (~ a;!) = (;!1);
m if ~ a =  and ! 6= !1;
M if (~ a;!) = (;!1) or (~ a =  and ! 6= !1);
u(~ a;!) otherwise.




!1 ! 2 
 n f!1g
a u(a;!1) u(a;!)
a0 u(a0;!1) +  u(a0;!) + 
 m + " M
 M m
all other a u(a;!1) u(a;!)
Let D0 = (A n fa0g;
;uj(Anfa0g)
) 2 D. Since a 2 '(D) \ (A n fa0g), IIA
implies that '(D0) = '(D) \ (A n fa0g) 6= ;. For all (";) 2 R2
+, D"; is
obtained from D0 by adding nitely many actions, so INH-NEM implies that
17'(D";) 6= ;.
Step 1: Let f"kgk2N be a sequence of strictly positive real numbers with
limk!1 "k = 0. We show that  2 '(D"k;0) for all k 2 N. By CONT, we then
have  2 '(D0;0).
Let k 2 N and suppose, to the contrary, that  62 '(D"k;0): Since '(D"k;0) 6= ;,
we have two cases:
  2 '(D"k;0). This is not possible, because  quasi-dominates  and apply-
ing Lemma 13 one obtains that  2 '(D"k;0).
  62 '(D"k;0). Since '(D"k;0) 6= ; and ; 62 '(D"k;0) there is an a 2
'(D"k;0) \ A. By IIA: '(D"k;0) \ A = '(D), so a 2 '(D"k;0):
 If u(a;!1)  m + "k, then  weakly dominates a: u(a;!)  u(;!) for
all ! 2 
, and there is an !0 2 
 such that u(a;!0) < u(;!0), because
otherwise u(a;!) = u(;!) for all ! 2 
, so that m = inf!2
 u(a;!) =
inf!2
 u(;!) = minfm + "k;Mg > m, a contradiction. Using IWD, it
follows that  2 '(D"k;0).
 If u(a;!1) > m+"k, then  quasi-dominates a: u(;!)  u(a;!) for all
! 2 
nf!1g and by denition of m = inf!2
 u(a;!), there is an !2 2 
,
dierent from !1 (since u(a;!1) > m+"k) with u(a;!2)  m+"k. This
implies that M = u(;!2)  u(a;!1) > m + "k  u(a;!2). By Lemma
13,  2 '(D"k;0):
In both subcases, we established that  2 '(D"k;0), in contradiction with
our assumption. Conclude that  2 '(D"k;0).
Step 2: We show that  2 '(D0;0).
18Let !2 2 












D2 can be obtained from D0;0 by deleting actions. By step 1, '(D0;0)\f;g 6=
;. So IIA implies that
'(D0;0) \ f;g = '(D2): (2)
Therefore,  2 '(D2). By DOS, '(D1) = '(D2), so  2 '(D1): Now Lemma
11 implies that  2 '(D1). Since '(D1) = '(D2), equation (2) gives that
 2 '(D0;0).
Step 3: Let fkgk2N be a sequence of strictly positive real numbers with
limk!1 k = 0. We show that a0 2 '(D0;k) for all k 2 N. By CONT, we then
have a0 2 '(D0;0).







where A3 = (A [ f;g)nfa0g for some ; = 2 A. By steps 1 and 2, '(D0;0)\
A3 6= ;, so IIA implies that '(D0;0) \ A3 = '(D3). Hence, from step 2,
 2 '(D3):
Let k > 0 and suppose that a0 62 '(D0;k). Since '(D0;k) 6= ; one obtains that
'(D0;k)\A3 6= ; and then IIA implies that  2 '(D0;k). So, reasoning as in
step 1: if u(a0;!1) + k  M, then a0 weakly dominates  and, by IWD, a0 2
'(Dk;0); otherwise, a0 quasi-dominates  and by Lemma 13: a0 2 '(Dk;0). In
both cases we reach a contradiction. Conclude that a0 2 '(Dk;0).
Step 4: Finally, we show that a0 2 '(D).
19By step 3 a0 2 '(D0;0) \ A. Hence, IIA implies '(D0;0) \ A = '(D), and so
a0 2 '(D). 2
These results will help us prove Theorem 6:
Proof of Thm. 6 It is easy to verify that the solution M satises all the
properties.
Let ' be a solution on D satisfying all the properties and let D = (A;
;u) 2
D. If '(D) = ;; then by r-NEM: M(D) = ;. So, assume that '(D) 6= ;.
Under the assumption that whether or not an action belongs to '(D) depends
exclusively on the inmum of its payos, it is true that '(D) = M(D): Namely,
consider the decision problem c D = (A; b 
; b u) where jb 
j = 1 and b u(a; b !) =
inf!2
 u(a;!) for all (a; b !) 2 A  b 
. We show that
'(D) = '(c D) (3)
Consider the decision problem f D = ( e A;
; e u) 2 D obtained from D by adding
to the action space a replica r(a) of every action a 2 A, i.e., e A = fa;r(a)ga2A
and with payos e ujA
 = u and e u(r(a);!) = inf!2
 u(a;!) for all a 2 A and
! 2 
.
By the assumption: a 2 '(D) if and only if fa;r(a)g  '(f D). Since '(D) 6= ;,
deletion of all non-replica actions and IIA imply that
a 2 '(D) , r(a) 2 '((fr(a)ga2A ;
; e ufr(a)ga2A
)): (4)
ANO and DOS imply that
r(a) 2 '((fr(a)ga2A ;
; e ufr(a)ga2A
)) , a 2 '(c D): (5)
20The equality (3) now follows from (4) and (5).
Write b 
 = fb !g. By OSR we know that '(c D) = M(c D) = argmaxa2A b u(a; b !).
Finally, since M satises all the properties we also have that M(c D) = M(D).
Therefore '(D) = M(D):
Now it remains to prove that whether or not an action belongs to '(D) de-
pends exclusively on the inmum of its payos.
Let a 2 '(D) and let m = inf!2
 u(a;!) and M = sup!2
 u(a;!): If m =
M, then u(a;!) = m for all ! 2 
. Let a 2 A be such that inf!2
 u(a;!) =
m. If sup!2
 u(a;!) = m, then u(a;!) = u(a;!) for all ! 2 
 and, by
ANO, a 2 '(D); otherwise, a weakly dominates a, so, by IWD, a 2 '(D).
Therefore, if m = M, then whether or not an action belongs to '(D) depends
exclusively on the inmum of its payos.
So henceforth assume that m < M. This implies in particular that 
 contains
at least two elements. Choose !1;!2 2 
, !1 6= !2.
Take D0 = (A;
0;u0) 2 D where 
0 = f!1;!2;!3g with !3 = 2 
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Similar to the proof of (3), using Lemma 14 instead of the assumption, it
follows that '(D) = '(D0).
Dene the sequence of decision problems fDkgk2N = f(A [ f;;g;
0;uk)gk2N
where ;; = 2 A, ukjA
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> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
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;!2)g
m otherwise.
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For all k 2 N, Dk can be obtained from D0 by adding three actions. So,
'(D0) 6= ; and INH-NEM imply that '(Dk) 6= ;. We show by induction that
 2 '(Dk) for all k 2 N.
Step 1:  2 '(D1):
D1 can be obtained from D0 by adding actions ;, and  in two steps:






0. Lemma 14 implies that  2 '(D0
1) if and only if
 2 '(D0
1). Suppose that ; = 2 '(D0
1). INH-NEM and '(D0) 6= ; imply
that '(D0
1) 6= ;, so there is an a 2 '(D0
1) \ A. Then, by IIA, '(D0
1) \ A =
'(D0). Hence, a 2 '(D0
1). Lemma 14 then implies that ; 2 '(D0
1), which
is a contradiction. Thus ; 2 '(D0
1).
Second, add action , whose utility is the (1
2; 1
2)-convex combination of
the utility of the actions  and , and by CONV:  2 '(D1):
23Step 2: Let k 2 N and assume that  2 '(Dn) for all n 2 N;n  k. We
show that  2 '(Dk+1).
The decision problem Dk+1 can be obtained from Dk in two steps:
First, delete actions  and  from Dk to obtain a new decision problem.
By IIA and the assumption that  2 '(Dk), its solution set contains .
Next, introduce actions  and  again, but now with their utility functions
equal to those in the problem Dk+1. Since  and  have the same inmum
and supremum,  belongs to the solution set if and only if  belongs to the
solution set of this new problem. Suppose that  and  do not belong to the
solution set. By INH-NEM and IIA,  belongs to the solution set. But then
Lemma 14 implies that  and  should belong to the solution set, which is
a contradiction. Thus  and  belong to the solution set.
Second, delete  from this new problem to obtain the decision problem
D0




0. By IIA ; 2
'(D0
k+1). Next, introduce action  again, but now with utility function
equal to the (1
2; 1
2)-convex combination of the payos of actions  and 
in D0
k+1, so the decision problem Dk+1 is obtained. By CONV it follows
that  2 '(Dk+1):
Conclude, by induction, that  2 '(Dk) for all k 2 N.
Let D1 = (A [ f;;g;
0;u1) be the limiting decision problem of the
sequence fDkgk2N. Notice that u1jA
0 = u0 and u1(;!) = u1(;!) =
u1(;!) = m for all ! 2 
0. Since  2 '(Dk) for all k 2 N, CONT implies
that  2 '(D1).
Take a 2 A such that inf!2
0 u0(a;!) = m. If sup!2
0 u0(a;!) = m, then
u1(a;!) = u0(a;!) = m = u1(;!) for all ! 2 
, so that a 2 '(D1) by
24ANO. Otherwise, a weakly dominates  and, by IWD, a 2 '(D1). Hence
a 2 '(D1) \ A, and using IIA it follows that '(D1) \ A = '(D0) = '(D).
Hence, a 2 '(D) for all a 2 A with inf!2
 u(a;!) = inf!2
 u(a;!) = m. 2
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